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Summary: When families make decisions about having a child ex ante, they calculate with steeply decreasing marginal utilities. 
In other words, the 1st baby brings a huge amount of pleasure (utility), while the 2nd and further babies bring less and less 
utilities. Historically, it hasn’t always been this way: in poor societies, the main motive for having children was that children 
were able to work from a young age. Therefore, marginal utility decreased only slightly, to the point around the average utility. 
The social utility of having children only has a slight influence on families; however, every new child’s social utility is almost 
the same. This explains politicians’ intentions to encourage families to have more children. The final conclusion is that within 
the factors taken into consideration in the study, there is no equilibrium, and the observable trends will not result in a social 
optimum. Decreasing population and the aging of the society cannot be eliminated or significantly alleviated on national level, 
no matter the amount of money the government is willing to spend to take over some of the costs parents bear to have children.1
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‘Let’s make a baby, Flóra, 
may it do the round-offs on the floor, aah’
Attila József: Fragments
This study is built on three modern age 
innovations: (1) the evolvement of pension 
systems covering the majority of the 
population, (2) due to the improvement of 
living standards and medical developments, 
the decrease in the number of mother, infant 
and child deaths and the increase of life 
expectancy at birth, (3) the emergence of 
oral contraceptive pills made family planning 
much safer than before.
The creators of the systems hardly thought 
of the anti-natalist consequences: if people 
expect a sufficient pension, they won’t 
‘need’ children to rely on when they get old. 
Therefore, linking the size of the amount of 
pensions and the number of grown-up children 
has been on the agenda of international 
discourses for a long time (demény, 1987).2 
The topic was already in the centre of an 
academic conference in 2012 in Hungary. My 
opinion regarding the subject was detailed 
in a respective study volume (Kovács, 2012). 
The title of my paper at that time accurately 
reflected the essence of its content: ‘twenty E-mail address: peter@mihalyi.com
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Arguments against Linking the Amount of 
pensions with the Number of Children’. My 
opinion hasn’t changed since: i don’t think 
that procreation can be encouraged through 
the pension system. On the contrary – as this 
paper will make it clear – , i am also sceptical 
regarding the question whether the number of 
children can be increased by any kind of state 
subsidy.
This paper is not a continuation of my 
previous one, much rather a step back in 
a logical sense. it is an attempt to answer 
a previous question: ‘why the majority of 
Hungarian families hasn’t had a third, fourth, 
fifth, etc. child for fifty years now?’ The added 
value of this article is that i am analysing the 
decisions regarding having children along the 
line of marginal utilities and marginal costs 
– and this, in the extra-long run, spanning 
from the start of the theoretical fertile age to 
death, i.e. from the age of 20 to 80. At the end 
of the analysis, it will be obvious that unlike 
traditional equilibrium models, for example, 
Becker’s (1976), in this model, the conflict of 
individual (family-level) and social (or public) 
interests cannot be resolved. The prevailing 
stable trends will not result in a social 
optimum, i.e. the total fertility rate of 2.05, 
which would ensure a demographic balance 
will not be restored in the foreseeable future.
THe ubIQuITous FamIly moDel 
oF TWo breaDWInners 
anD one or TWo cHIlDren
in modern societies, having children is an 
individual decision. As Gál (2014) put it: 
‘the decision what economists call (…) fertility 
decision is in fact an infertility decision. For the 
most part, people don’t decide to have children, 
they decide to not to have them. Decreasing 
fertility primarily means that more people go 
further in their measures to prevent conception.’ 
With practical terms, it is about the fact that
•	the biologically determined female 
and male fertility can be overridden 
by a conscious family planning; when 
couples find the time is right to have 
children, women temporarily suspend 
contraception methods; if necessary, 
women prevent the unwanted child from 
being born by an abortion;
•	liberal societies increasingly accept 
genetic exceptions and/or consciously 
adopted non-binary lifestyles (LGBtQ, 
singlehood, asexuality, etc.), without 
forcing people to act ‘normal’.3
Ex ante, parents decide to have a baby 
for the pleasure it brings, and because this 
genetic programme is not overridden by other 
considerations.4 For parents, a child is valuable 
for itself. to use an economists’ metaphor, 
children are lifelong durable goods.5 A child, 
once born, remains a source of joy for the 
remaining decades of parents’ lives. to a 
considerable extent, having children is still a 
‘female’ decision today, but, to simplify this, 
in this paper, i will consider it as a family 
decision. The József Attila quote i chose as the 
motto of this writing alludes to this notion.
in optimal material circumstances, which 
historically were the privilege of only a few, 
female fertility can be really high. Between 
ages of 20 and 39, Maria Theresa, the ruler of 
the Habsburg empire gave life to 16 children; 
in 79 percent of the calendar years, she had 
a childbirth event. today, less than four out 
of 100 women in the fertile age give birth in 
a given calendar year in Hungary. This is the 
so called childbirth probability, the accurate, 
computed value of which is 3.87 percent.6 
Compared to Maria Theresa’s example, the 
difference is twenty times as much.
in Hungary, a typical family has had one or 
two children for the last half century. Only 12 
percent of women in a completed fertility age 
(35-39 years) had 3 or more children in 1970, 
 dispute – pension debates 
528  public Finance Quarterly  2019/4
and in 2016, this rate slightly decreased to 8 
percent. The reasons of this are well known, so 
a summary will suffice here.
1 The biologically ‘ready’ human working capabilities are worth less and less on the 
labour market. in the past, it was natural that 
able-bodied men and women were capable 
of (physical) labour without any formal 
education. Neoclassical economy categories 
(Becker, 1992) express this in a way that prior 
to the industrial revolution, the utility of the 
labour force (L) was given right from birth, 
and there was no way to significantly increase 
it. Moreover, the majority of children were 
actually working from the age of 5-6 – they 
took care of animals and/or their little siblings. 
The sons of lower-class urban residents entered 
in the workforce as apprentices, possibly before 
they hit the age of 10. From this point of view, 
it was a realistic calculation on parents’ part 
that it’s good to have a lot of children, because 
they have two hands, but only one mouth. 
Then, industrialisation changed everything. 
The development of technology forced boys, 
and in a few decades, also girls to participate 
in school-based education.
2 As in many Western european countries, women of the upper classes 
de facto used abortion already between the 
two wars in Hungary (Mink, 1991). And 
this became the norm for lower classes, 
too. starting in June 1956, termination of 
pregnancies became legal. Reliable and cheap 
oral contraceptive pills became widely used 
in 1968. in the wake of this, regular sexual 
activity became risk-free for young unmarried 
men and women, extending the period of 
mate selection. The possibility to plan the 
timing and number of children meant for an 
increase in the relative utility of university 
education (mainly for women, but also slightly 
for men), because they didn’t have to factor in 
an unexpected pregnancy, which would result 
in the interruption of their studies.7 in the 
meantime, the number of followers of anti-
family-planning idealist religions decreased; 
therefore, less and less men and women had 
moral issues related to the new technologies 
of contraception. Weakening of religiousness 
is also reflected in the fact that 45 percent of 
Hungarian children were born out of wedlock 
at some point.
3 As, due to the studies, the breadwinning age shifted to a later age, it was also 
necessary that families would be started at 
a later age, too. However, this change went 
against evolutionist reasoning. Couples want 
children at an age past the biologically optimal 
age. Medical science had long discovered 
the how’s and why’s of the decrease of the 
probability of conception after the age of 30. 
Less is known concerning the reasons and 
the rate of the decline in middle-aged men’s 
fertility, but the decrease itself remains a hard-
core fact. it is also well-known that out of 
pregnancies taken on past the parents’ 20s, 
the probability of having a child with a serious 
illness exponentially increases.8 This is the 
phenomenon called by the public as ‘couples 
ran out of time’.9
4 it is a frequently cited argument that there is a significant discrepancy between 
the desired number of children and the actual 
number of children in families,10 and many 
draw the conclusion that this gap could be 
eliminated by state subsidies.11 There are two 
problems with this rationale. One of them is 
that during interviews, people are inclined to 
give answers of which they think would reflect 
the opinion of the majority. The other is that 
we have to take it as natural that the majority 
of people will never be able to fulfil most of 
their wishes during their lifetimes. if anyone 
on the street would be asked how many rooms 
they wanted in their apartment, how many 
times a year they wanted to go on vacation, or 
what would be the amount they would deem 
a proper salary for themselves, we’d experience 
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the same discrepancies between the wishes and 
the actual state of affairs. This typical real-
life situation is reflected in an outstandingly 
concise way in a well-known short story by 
Karinthy Frigyes, the title ‘Meeting with a 
Young Man’. The internationally well-known, 
Hungarian economist, János Kornai argues that 
people’s aspirations and expectations from life 
cannot be fulfilled, not even on the theoretical 
level, because they are contradicting goals.12 
Maria Theresa’s example is a good one in this 
aspect, too: she was supported by an army of 
nannies, cooks and laundresses. This was the 
reason she could pursue her many goals and 
tasks at the same time: being a mother and a 
'working' politician.
5 Many are prone to assume that choosing to have many children is an ethnic issue. 
in such cases, Hungarians like to refer to the 
situation of Romany people – erroneously. One 
cannot emphasise it enough (Husz, 2011) 
that ‘gypsy’ birth numbers can be basically 
attributed to poverty and lack of education.
6 in the united states, inequality types associated with the shift in mate 
selection customs are widely discussed. 
essentially, it is about a phenomenon 
known for centuries, wherein individuals are 
likely to mate with individuals with similar 
backgrounds and interests (in Latin: Similis 
simili gaudet). today, it is no longer about 
this traditional formula, much rather about 
the increase of the proportion of women who 
completed higher education, and the statistical 
probability of couples’ similar educational 
levels has also been increasing.13 However, if 
during the years of marriage, women bearing 
several children14 withdraw from the labour 
market for a long time, thus depreciating 
their own human capital, the gap regarding 
knowledge, education and social prestige will 
grow between spouses, which may result in 
adverse effects in the quality of the marriage. 
For this reason, it has to be considered natural 
that only a few women are willing to surrender 
their careers for ‘full-time motherhood’. 
However, to have a third, fourth and fifth 
child in a family, in fact a lot more full time 
mothers would be needed.
7 it is rarely mentioned that the temporal distance between the time when young 
people start families and the time of their 
parents’ death has been steadily growing. it is 
also common that ‘young people’ only come 
to inherit the family assets only when they are 
over 60, so this wealth cannot help when it is 
needed the most – with the financial burdens 
of having children. This controversy strongly 
prevails on the real estate market – and not 
only in Budapest, but also in Vienna and New 
York.
THe naTure oF InDIvIDual uTIlITIes 
anD cosTs
The main assertion of this study is that 
the decision of having children is made in 
consideration of the utilities and costs, and on 
a relatively few occasions. to rephrase it: the 
decision regarding the number of children is 
always a marginal decision, but not a customary 
routine decision. to use the terminology 
of Kornai’s (1971) Anti-equilibrium, it is a 
basic decision.15 The decision is the result of 
the careful juxtaposition of marginal utilities 
and marginal costs of transiting from being 
childless into a situation of having one child, 
of transiting from having one child into having 
two children, from having two children into 
having three children, etc.
On Fig. 1, the individual marginal utilities 
(Mu) and (net) marginal costs (MC) are 
compared from the parents’ point of view, 
on a short-term, from the birth of the first 
child until the last child has grown up. The 
average situation is depicted here, wherein, in 
a Hungarian family, upbringing and education 
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of children, and starting a separate household 
for them takes about 30 years.
The analytical method is simplified to the 
extreme. utilities and costs are juxtaposed, but 
none of the items will be monetised. i.e., no 
attempts will be made to aggregate different 
items. We will only compare money with 
money, and pleasure with pleasure.
it is commonly thought that parents love 
all of their kids the same. However, this 
is only valid ex post – for children already 
born. The approach of this study differs from 
the common approach. We start from the 
assumption that for parents, ex ante, birth 
of the first, healthy child is an immense 
pleasure. primarily, this utility is the reason for 
procreation.16 The amount of this pleasure is 
considered as a unit, i.e. 1. Compared to this, 
birth of the second child is a lot less additional 
pleasure. The marginal utility of the third child 
is even less, though surveys show that after two 
children of the same sex, parents often have 
the desire to have a third child, because they 
want a girl after the two boys, or vice versa.17 
This picture can be complicated even further 
by the increasingly common practice of re-
marriage, when mothers or fathers of already 
born children intend to have another child 
from their second relationship (as they have 
started a new family) – this may increase the 
marginal utility of the 2nd or 3rd child. The fact 
that we assumed a monotonously decreasing 
utility function in the present paper does 
not represent anything special – equilibrium 
Figure 1
IndIvIdual margInal utIlItIes and net margInal costs of havIng chIldren  
(1st generatIon) 
          MUi Mother’s/family’s marginal utilities and marginal costs, 0–25 years
1
Pleasure
Pleasure
        year 0
Pleasure
          MCi 1st child 2nd child 3rd child
Dedicated Dedicated Dedicated
free time free time free time
money money money
loss of wages + loss of wages + loss of wages +
1 loss of human capital loss of human capital loss of human capital
Source:  own edited
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models almost always make this assumption.18 
The novelty of this approach is that we assume 
a steeply decreasing function, because we 
model today’s situation in Hungary, when the 
majority of families don’t plan 3-4-5 or more 
children by default.
Any circumstance other than the pleasure 
is considered on the side of the net costs, 
including all monetary (cash) and in-kind 
benefits, tax allowances, etc. given to families. 
These items are reducing the costs. On the 
other side, of course, the monetary costs 
of upbringing children, parents’ free time 
dedicated to their children and the loss of 
(mostly women’s) wages lost also appear on 
the side of costs. part of the costs can be saved 
if couples have more kids (part of clothing 
is re-usable, playing with two kids takes just 
as much time than playing with one, etc.), 
but their proportion within the total costs is 
negligible.
in Hungarian circumstances, when mothers 
have been entitled to 3 years of paid leave after 
each child for 50 (!) years, withdrawal from 
the workforce for several years is an important 
human capital cost item, making return into 
the labour market more difficult, ultimately 
resulting in lower career wages and pension. 
Risks are also considered a kind of cost factor. 
When parents decide to have a second and 
third child, they consider the fact that the 
dissolution of their marriage or divorce after 
having two or more kids would result in a very 
difficult situation for both parties. The parent 
raising the children alone will face double 
workload, while the other party (mostly 
husbands) may face a crisis situation due to 
the child support payment obligations, which 
are quite strict in Hungary.19 This is shown by 
the indexes of subjective welfare. According 
to the 2016 survey of the Hungarian Central 
statistical Office (HCsO), 75-76 percent of 
people living in a relationship, marriage or 
other, with or without children, said they were 
happy or mostly happy. This number for single 
parents is 55 percent.20
No surprise that the risk of divorce is yet 
another factor encouraging women to stay 
in the labour market, because this means 
a protection against fatal poverty – which 
hinders them from having the 3rd or 4th 
child.21 to consider all these factors, Fig. 1 
is created to make it clear: according to our 
estimation, individual net marginal costs of 
having children will not decrease with the 
increase of the number of children (they may 
even increase).
Fig. 2 juxtaposes the ex post individual 
marginal utilities and (net) marginal costs of 
having children in the long run, i.e. between 
26 and 60 years (calculated from the birth 
of the 1st child). This figure compares the 
utilities and costs that parents have to factor 
in for the times after they have raised their 
children. From parents’ point of view, several 
benefits are present: the very existence of the 
child (professional and other successes, their 
happiness), and then seeing their grandchildren 
to come to existence and to grow. Though it 
is not commonly expressed in words, but it is 
obvious that only those who have children can 
have grandchildren. These emotional utilities 
are – or may be – supplemented by the fact 
that adult, self-sufficient children are able to 
help their parents financially (if necessary) or 
support them with their physical care. More 
children will give more security to parents 
than only one child. With the increasing life 
expectancy, it is also common that part of the 
physical care of grandparents is taken over by 
the grandchildren, to help their own parents. 
Therefore, we estimate that – unlike in the short 
run – these marginal utilities are decreasing 
only slightly in the long run. At the same 
time, in the majority of families, the parents 
of parents (grandparents) also participate in 
raising the children.22 This may require extra 
time and money – but essentially, these net 
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marginal cost are roughly the same for each 
child. These aspects will not change the fact 
that the decisions of having children are mostly 
based on short-term considerations, yet these 
decisions cannot be changed (retrospectively) 
in the long run.
THe naTure oF socIeTal uTIlITIes 
anD cosTs
Obviously, in the first 16-18 years of a 
child being born, they only mean costs for 
the society, with no direct utilities. A very 
interesting example is the otherwise very 
collectivist Japan, where the decision of having 
children is considered an individual, unique 
and rare decision to the extent that social 
security does not cover the 9 months of out-
patient prenatal care or in-patient childbirth. 
parents should sort this to the expense of their 
private insurance or cash reserves – so the 
Japanese public opinion. upon turning 16-18, 
part of the cohort enters into the workforce, 
but the majority carries on with their studies. 
This means that their social utilities will only 
kick in when they turn 18-29 and finally 
start working. The size of this social utility is 
roughly the same in the case of each young 
person. in this age group, the social costs of 
child maintenance are considered as the same 
for each parity23 (of course, this is a significant 
simplification). This situation is depicted in 
Fig. 3.
Figure 2
IndIvIdual margInal utIlItIes and net margInal costs of havIng chIldren  
(2nd generatIon)
          MUi Mother’s/family’s long-term marginal utilities and marginal costs, 26-60 years
1 Pleasure
(adult child 
+ grandchildren)
Pleasure (adult child 
Financial support + grandchildren)
Financial support
Pleasure support
Physical care  
at old age
Physical care  
at old age
Physical care  
at old ageyear 26
          MCi 1st child 2nd child 3rd child
Help in raising 
grandchildren
Help in raising 
grandchildren
Help in raising 
grandchildren
0,2
1
Source:  own edited
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An easily acceptable opinion is that there are 
extreme historical occasions, when increasing 
of the number of children overrides every other 
goal. These are the periods of war. But, even 
in these cases, it is true that many years elapse 
until a new-born (boy) becomes combat-ready. 
in the past, wars were quite common – rivalling 
clans, tribes and countries were waging wars 
literally on an ongoing basis. Therefore, this 
long-term factor deeply ingrained in societies’ 
value systems. However, modern age brought 
long peaceful periods for developed countries. 
This resulted in a decline in the significance 
of this aspect. On the other hand, four-
five year election periods became generally 
common. Fig. 3 shows the dilemma of modern 
governments. For about two decades, having 
children results in significantly more costs for 
governments representing social interests ‘by 
default’ than in utilities. in the meantime, it 
is also clear that exceptions still exist, i.e. there 
are still countries operating in continuous 
threats of war. This, at least partially, explains 
the economically very advanced israel’s high 
female fertility (tFR = 2.92).
Apart from military aspects, politicians and 
the public derive children’s social utility from 
demographics. But, even within this, a shift 
in the emphasis is also present. instead of the 
absolute population numbers, the focus is now 
on aging of the society. in their active years 
(31-65 years), all adult children represent the 
same value to the society, but after that, for the 
age group of 66-80-year-olds, in other words, 
the inactive population is entitled to pension, 
and also, the social costs of illnesses are also 
Figure 3
margInal utIlItIes and margInal costs at the socIetal level  
(1st generatIon) 
          MUi Short-term social marginal utilities and marginal costs (0–30 years)
In the period of 0–16 years, there is no utility at all!
1
0,2 The value created 
by 16–29-year-old 
employees
The value created 
by 16–29-year-old 
employees
The value created 
by 16–29-year-old 
employeesyear 16
          MCi 1st child 2nd child 3rd child
Financial burdens of the 
education  
of 16-29-year-olds
Financial burdens  
of the education  
of 16-29-year-olds
Financial burdens  
of the education  
of 16-29-year-olds
1
Source: own edited
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steeply increasing with age. On the other 
hand, social utilities of pensioners include 
their contribution to families in raising 
their grandchildren (see Fig. 4). Generally, it 
becomes clear that in such a long run (from 
the 31st year after the 1st child is born until 
parents’ death), the social marginal utilities of 
each child greatly exceeds their marginal costs.
There is one more account of having 
children; however, its political relevance 
cannot be estimated today. The ecologically 
induced social discourse on very long-term 
social interests has raised the question in 
many of us: should we have children at all, 
when the ever increasing population on earth 
makes natural resources more and more 
scarce, aggravating climate-change-induced 
problems, such as potential lack of food and 
water, climate migration, etc. On international 
level, this ideology is represented by the 
movement called BirthStrike, originating from 
the united Kingdom.24 Moreover, arguments 
exist (Kapelner, 2019) that economic growth 
will stop; therefore, the living standards of 
children born today will be a lot worse than 
ours. Our children will have to live their lives 
in unprecedented temperature fluctuations, 
draughts, and lack of food and water. if this 
is so, may we expose them to these ordeals 
by giving them life? Dávid Mihályi (2019) 
contends that the generation of today’s parents 
should only have as many children as we can 
assume of, that with an environmentally aware 
conduct, they will decrease their carbon-
Figure 4
margInal utIlItIes and margInal costs at the socIetal level  
(2nd generatIon)
          MUi Long-term social marginal utilities and marginal costs (31–80 years)
1
The work  
of 31-65-year-old 
workers  
(+ contribution to the 
care of parents  
and grandparents) 
The work  
of 31-65-year-old 
workers  
(+ contribution to the 
care of parents  
and grandparents)
The work  
of 31-65-year-old 
workers  
(+ contribution to the 
care of parents  
and grandparents)
year 31
          MCi 1st child 2nd child 3rd child
years 66–80:  
old-age pension and 
health care
years 66–80:  
old-age pension and 
health care
years 66–80:  
old-age pension and 
health care
1
Source:  own edited
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dioxide emissions below today’ Hungarian 
average, i.e. in total, the new children will not 
have an aggregate diverse effect on the planet’s 
climate balance.
conclusIons
in this study, we discussed why Hungarian 
families rarely have a second, third and fourth 
child today. Applying the terms of marginal 
utilities and marginal costs, we concluded that 
the individual marginal utility of the 2nd and 
3rd child is significantly less than the 1st child’s 
marginal utility both on shorter and longer 
terms, while marginal costs surely remain the 
same for the first two decades. Regarding the 
16-29-year-olds, the social marginal utility 
of the 2nd and 3rd child remains constant on 
the shorter term, but the extent thereof is 
insignificant. in the meantime, marginal costs 
are essentially the same on both shorter and 
longer term. essentially, the problem is that 
from the families’ point of view, not many 
arguments are for having a 2nd and 3rd child.
This bias – in peacetime and sustainably 
– cannot be offset, either by money or in-
kind social allowances. especially not, when 
the majority of potentially affected citizens is 
not even aware of the family support system, 
and those who know it, don’t trust in its 
sustainability (ignits, Kapitány, 2006) and/or 
deem the government’s support tool unsuitable 
for the purpose. Concerning this latter, the 
latest report by the state Audit Office of 
Hungary (2019, p. 10) contains an important 
warning, calling decision-makers’ attention 
to the fact that 76 (!) percent of interviewed 
young adults opine that home buying grants 
don’t or hardly affect their willingness to have 
children (based on a 2017 survey of higher 
education students). No matter the amount 
the government is willing to spend on family 
policy support, they will only bring long-
term changes in the population policy, if the 
rationale of government regulation is largely 
identical with the stance of the scientific-
professional opinion, and it is not subject of 
sharp political conflicts.
slightly surprisingly, an econometric 
analysis prepared by Hétfa Research institute 
(2019) showed that in the short run (0-3 
years), the various family support systems 
tested in Hungary have little effect on the 
tFR and childbirth probability. especially, if 
we consider that several government measures 
were ‘only’ good for bringing forward the 
time already planned first or second children 
conceive.25 According to their calculations, a 
10 percent increase of Child tax Allowance 
– which would mean a significant increase 
in costs – would only result in an increase of 
the probability of having ‘extra children’ from 
3.87 to 3.97 (supposing that the number of 
fertile-age women is constant).
An Unreal Dystopia
Harmonising individual and community 
interests has always necessitated sophisticated 
social mechanisms in every era. Regarding 
work, violence-based social conventions had 
prevailed for long millenniums. Later, it was 
replaced by paid work. Wars were partially 
conducted by using market mechanisms 
– rulers deployed mercenaries. The other 
possibility was the institution of mandatory 
conscription. Contribution to the social 
security system is a legal obligation in most 
countries. As demonstrated above, ultimately, 
decrease in the number of children is in direct 
correlation with the fact that there is no threat 
of war, contraception is easily available, and 
due to the prolonged studies of women, the 
first child is born later in their lives. Moreover, 
not having children at all is also accepted in 
modern societies.
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Let’s think it over. in today’s circumstances, 
is it possible to introduce legal regulations 
to reverse these processes? is it possible to 
think of sufficiently draconian measures? In 
abstracto, a solution could be the ban on all 
modern forms of contraception and deny the 
possibility of higher education from women. 
Obviously, any government that tries this 
would lose the next election, or possibly be 
defeated by an uprising in the matter of days. 
if, for some reason these measures stay, the 
majority of women would choose to emigrate 
right after they completed primary school. All 
in all: decrease in the tFR is irreversible.
Who Benefits from a Pro-natalist 
Government Policy?
in Hungary, measures taken to encourage 
childbirth – from creating nursery places 
through home-buying support policies to child 
tax allowances and all sorts of monetary grants 
– are generally popular both in the opinion of 
the affected families and the public. However, 
there is a misunderstanding here: state help is 
only suitable to – ceteris paribus – mitigate the 
inequalities in income and wealth resulting 
from having children (Gál, 2014; sAO 
2019), but they are not suitable to sustainably 
increase fertility. As shown in Table 1, the 
Hungarian government is spending a relatively 
high amount on family support – significantly 
more than the average in the OeCd.
There is a further, significant problem: 
the forms of family support system applied 
in the last 10 years were strongly pro-rich, 
which means that among families with the 
same number of children, families with higher 
income and more assets would benefit more. 
Hétfa institute’s research for 2000-2014 also 
revealed that family policy expenditures – 
Table 1
PublIc sPendIng on famIly benefIts, as a Percentage of gdP
country Percentage
sweden 3.5
united Kingdom 3.5
France 3.0
Hungary 3.0
czech republic 2.0
slovakia 2.0
Poland 1.5*
Israel 1.9
usa 0.6
oecD average 2.0
Comment: Total monetary and non-monetary support.  out of the listed items, child tax allowance is not considered.  This – precisely in 
the case of Hungary – results in a considerable underestimation.
* 2014 
Source: oecD: Family benefits public spending, https://data.oecd.org/socialexp/family-benefits-public-spending.htm#indicator-chart, 
downloaded on 30 June 2019.
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with an average of quite low positive aggregate 
effects – encouraged highly educated women 
between the ages of 30 and 40, living in the 
western counties the most to have children.
The same goes for the new policies 
introduced on 1 July 2019. According to a new 
impact calculation conducted by a financial 
institute,26 a well-situated family with a total 
net monthly income of 700 thousand forints, if 
agrees to have 4 children, buys a new property 
and avails 15 million forints of supported loan 
(CsOK), may get almost 50 million forints 
of non-refundable state subsidy. if a young 
married couple around 30 years of age agrees 
to have 4 children, and the husband’s only 
income comes from public work, the wife is 
on maternity leave and they don’t have any 
savings, they will not be given any loan or 
support; thus, they won’t be able to buy any 
property, new or second-hand. Therefore, in 
their case, non-refundable grant will amount 
to 0 forints. if university students get married, 
agree to have two children, they don’t have any 
own income yet, but take 10M forints of loan 
to buy a used home, they will get 3.2M forints 
of budget support. in addition, they get 2.5M 
forints of grant to buy a new, seven-seat car – 
but this only means an actual support for large 
families with an exceptionally high income.
The Optimum Cannot Be Reached  
in a Closed Economy
unlike neo-classical equilibrium models, 
wherein the optimisation of individual/family 
life strategies lead to the social optimum 
through the long-term yield of human capital 
investment spent on education, the most 
important conclusion of this study is that 
under the circumstances shown in the study, 
there is no equilibrium. individually, every 
woman and every family ‘somehow’ manages 
to balance work and children (one form of this 
is the option of not having children), but the 
measurable, stable tendencies will not lead to 
a social optimum: decrease of the population 
and aging of the society will remain. Without 
massive immigration pro-natalist government 
policies can only change this to a slight extent, 
and even that, on the expense of increasing 
social inequalities.
Notes
1 i would like to say thank you for the comments 
regarding the first version of this article to József 
Banyár, erzsébet Kovács, András simonovics and 
Ágnes szabó-Morvai, along with the anonymous 
referees of this journal. declaration: i didn’t receive 
any direct financial support from any sources for 
writing the study.
2 it’s worth mentioning that in the united states, 
where there is no federal-level regulation on the 
institution of maternity leave, the exact opposite 
idea has been prevailing since 2018. A bill put 
forth by senator Marco Rubio and ivanka trump 
aims that young mothers could take a 2-month 
paid maternity leave on the expense of their own 
pension time, delaying the time of eligibility. 
https://www.vox.com/2018/8/6/17648462/
rubio-ivanka-republican-paid-leave
3 Here and below i will disregard other possibilities 
that – from the statistical cardinality point of 
view and each separately – are insignificant or 
outright negligible (miscarriages, male and female 
infertility, adopting, surrogate motherhood, 
twins, rape, baby murder, undetected pregnancies, 
etc.).
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4 Holtzer (2012) p. 134
5 Mészáros (2012), p. 9
6 This is the so called childbirth probability, the 
accurate, computed value of which is 3.87. see: 
Hétfa Research institute (2019).
7 The study of Goldin, Katz (2002) demonstrates 
the special reasons why this causal correlation 
had been especially strong in the united states 
from the mid-1960s. On one hand, propagation 
of oral contraceptives was significantly facilitated 
by the fact that the age of majority was lowered 
to 18 years (which meant that parental consent 
was no longer needed), on the other hand, by this 
time, a significant expansion of higher education 
capacities took place, the positive impacts of which 
were mostly leveraged by boys until then. Then, 
just like in so many other fields, the exemplary 
effects of the American lifestyle prevailed in every 
other country of the developed world.
8 The likelihood of a 20-year old woman having a 
baby with a down syndrome is 1 to 525, while 
this chance is 1 to 65 in the case of a 40-year old 
woman. https://www.womenshealthmag.com/
health/a21563046/best-age-to-have-a-baby/
9 Also, in many cases, men and women seeking 
a long-term relationship while living alone will 
never get to the situation that would reveal 
whether there is a medical limitation to their 
fertility. it is a fact that between 2001 and 2011, 
the proportion of 41 to 45 year old Hungarian 
childless women showed an increase from 7.8 
percent to 11.2 percent. As an extreme example, it 
is worth mentioning that this problem is present 
even stronger in Japan, a country lot richer than 
Hungary: in 2015, 24.6 percent of 18-39 year 
old women had never had any heterosexual 
relation, while this number was 25.8 percent of 
men in the same age group. Ghaznavi and co. 
(2019)
10 The ideal number of children in 2016 would be 
2.2 for both men and women, while the planned 
number of children is an average 2.0 for women, 
and 1.9 for men.
11 spéder, Kapitány (2007). Out of the latest 
discourses, see state Audit Office of Hungary 
(2019), KiNCs (2019), Koncz (2019).
12 Kornai (1971) p. 214
13 in biology, this is called non-random based mate 
selection, or homogamy. The expression used in 
social sciences is assortative mating. see: Mihályi, 
szelényi (2016).
14 The three-year long maternity leave in Hungary 
was introduced in 1967. The public was told that 
it was designed to encourage having children. 
This myth still exists today (state Audit Office 
of Hungary, 2019, p. 5). Only a few insiders 
knew that in fact, this measure was part of the 
1968 economic reform. Namely, the government 
assumed that in the wake of the pro-market 
reforms, firms will make masses of uneducated, 
young women redundant, and having children 
earlier would mean an immediate safe haven for 
them.
15 see Kornai (1971). sub-chapters 9.3, 10.4, 13.4, 
14.6. About the significance of the two different 
types of decisions, see Mihályi (2013).
16 Of course, the assertion can be reversed: 
individuals without children will bear huge short- 
and long-term drawbacks (disutilities).
17 in several cultures, boys are deemed more 
valuable than girls – this contortion still exist 
in Hungary today, but only with a marginal 
significance.
18 Németh (2016, 2017) also introduces a model 
with similarly decreasing marginal utility.
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19 The risk of divorce is significant, and – even if not 
expressed in the language of demographic categories 
– people are fully aware of this. in 2016, almost 
30 percent of families with children meant that a 
single parent raised the children. in 24 percent of 
such families, these single parents raised two, and in 
7 percent, three or more kids. Raising kids as a single 
parent is mostly done by mothers. Their proportion 
is 86 percent of all single-parent families.
20 in reference to the 2016 population census of the 
HCsO (2019), p. 207
21 Hétfa Research institute (2019)
22 if the child will have her children in Hungary, 
which is not to be taken for granted these days.
23 professional term for live birth sequence.
24 Wynes, Kimberly (2017) opines that if 1 less child 
was born in each developed country, that would 
mean 20 times of the CO2 emission decrease than 
the decrease that would result in a total ban on 
the use of vehicles for a year in the developing 
countries.
25 see Berde, Kovács (2016) and the findings of 
Hétfa Research institute (2019), of the latest 
discourse.
26 The calculations of City Hitelbróker Kft. are 
available in the magazine HVG 2019, 27 June, 
(pp. 6-10)
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